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PERMISSIBLE ACCOMMODATION AND INCLUSIVE
PLURALISM: A RESPONSE TO JUDGE ARLIN ADAMS
Charles R. Strain*
In a chilling rain early last spring I stood at the Daley Center in Chicago
waiting for a chance to view one of the four existing "originals" of the
Magna Carta. When my turn to enter the darkened trailer of the traveling
exhibition finally came, I saw a vellum sheet whose words, muddied by
centuries of oxidation, were indecipherable. Driven to my encyclopedia to
retrieve what the Magna Carta actually said, I entered a world whose basic
presuppositions were alien even to a person trained as an historian. Yet, I
was able to imagine the outrage of those English barons had they known
that their definition of "freemen" would be broadened to include the likes
of this descendant of Irish peasants.
I preface this discussion to give existential ballast to what I perceive to be
the common working assumptions of jurists and scholars of religion: Culture,
any culture, is a conversation with its past and an ongoing argument among
contemporaries about the meaning of that past. We continue to be shaped
by the charter documents of our culture, whether religious or secular, because
they are classics in the precise sense that they manifest an enduring power
to provoke new forms of thought and action. They are statements written,
as the anti-Federalist Richard Henry Lee said of the Bill of Rights, "for
ages and nations yet unborn."' But, we also develop revised versions of the
past in the necessary attempt to make it not alien but usable.
I. THE QUEST FOR THE HISTORICAL INTENT OF THE FOUNDERS
Judge Adams, in making his case for a zone of "permissible accommo-
dations" separate and distinct from "forbidden accommodations" and
"mandatory accommodations" of religion, immediately interprets both the
* Charles R. Strain, B.A., M.A., Duquesne University; Ph.D., University of Chicago.
Dr. Strain is an Associate Professor of Religious Studies and Director of the Master of Arts
in Liberal Studies Program at DePaul University.
Judge Arlin Adams, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 1969-87, spoke
at the Fourth Annual Lecture hosted by the DePaul University Center for Church/State Studies
on April 2, 1987. Judge Adams was assisted in his written summary of his speech, which
appears in this volume, by Sarah Barringer Gordon.
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"original intent" underlying the religion clauses of the first amendment and
the historical reasons why that intent was necessarily expanded. Jurists
engaged in such an endeavor, I believe, can learn a good deal from the
similar struggles of religious scholars to interpret the charter documents of
their religious communities.
Biblical scholars throughout the nineteenth century, for example, engaged
in what is called the "quest for the historical Jesus." This was, in effect,
an attempt to differentiate the "original intent" of the founder of Christi-
anity from subsequent interpretations of the Christian community. Looking
back at over a half century of such endeavors, Albert Schweitzer argued
that the "historical Jesus" was largely a projection of the psyche of his
many interpreters-a face in the bottom of the well.2 Only by accentuating
the differences between the past and present, he insisted, can we guard
against the "face in the well" syndrome.3 In the wake of Schweitzer's
critique, scholars now conclude that valid interpretation involves the con-
scious effort to fuse the non-congruent horizons of the past and present to
form new interpretations specifically designed to meet the needs of the
present.
4
Judge Adams's reading of the intent underlying the religion clauses is, in
effect, an attribution of the face-in-the-well syndrome to those who advocate
strict separation of church and state. Like Justice Black in Everson v. Board
of Education,5 they project the "wall of separation" metaphor back to the
very bottom of the well. But, Judge Adams's criticisms are also implicitly
directed against broad accommodationists. While they accentuate the Foun-
ders' recognition of the necessity of religiously motivated moral behavior
for the maintenance of republican institutions, broad accommodationists
disregard key aspects of the non-establishment mandate. In other words they
see only the desired fragment of the face at the bottom of the well.
It would not be fair to conclude that Judge Adams simply gives us a
different version of the face-in-well syndrome. Nor is it accurate to say, as
one scholar has, that given the conflict of interpretation over the original
scope and meaning of the religion clauses, "[i]n the end the Supreme Court
is free to give this language the meaning it chooses." '6 In Judge Adams's
estimation, the Court must be constrained by a complex reading of the
2. See A. SCHWEITZER, TrE QUEST OF THE HISTORICAl. JESUS (3d ed. 1954).
3. A. SCHWEITZER, supra note 2 at 307, 310-11, 396-401.
4. See H. GADAMER, supra note 1, at 269-74. See also Troeltsch, What Does Essence of
Christianity Mean?, WRITINGS IN THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 124-79 (R. Morgan & M. Pye ed.
1977).
5. 330 U.S. 1 (1946) (Court asserted necessity for strict wall of separation but concluded
that tax monies expended to transport children to public and Catholic schools did not violate
religion clauses). Cf. A. REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AM. PUB. LIFE 111-12 (1985) (questions whether
the most separationist of the Founders intended anything quite as drastic as what is conveyed
in this metaphor).
6. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964), quoted in T. CURRY, supra note
1, at vii-viii.
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Founders' historical context and by an historically evolved understanding of
the State's relationship to society in the present.
The historical context of the Founders, however, is far more complex and
ambiguous than I can present here. The Founders' consensus that the federal
government should have no power or role in religious matters hid a disparity
of opinions over what exactly constitutes an establishment of religion. The
Founders' public practice of a civil religion with a decidedly Protestant-
Christian cast did not seem to contradict their commitment to religious
freedom. The prevailing Protestant ethos represented to these Americans
simply "the common coin of civilized living." 7 Those who view the "original
intent" of the Founders as a sacred coin to be passed from hand to hand
unchanged, misread our ambiguous past. Like religious fundamentalists,
they fail to see that the deepest intentions of any charter document can only
be preserved dialectically; that is, through a process which exposes what was
incomplete or confused in the Founders' thinking, and what was biased in
the application of their principles and which synthesizes their contributions
with enlarged principles.'
II. ACCOMMODATION AND THREE CoRE SOCIAL VALUES
Judge Adams shows how changes in the legal and political landscape
expanded the meaning and application of the religion clauses. I believe,
however, that a stronger propellant was the change in the social landscape.
At the time of the Revolution, Roman Catholics comprised slightly less than
one percent of the population and Jews less than one tenth of one percent.
While de facto pluralism existed by the mid-nineteenth century, it was not
until after World War II that America consciously began to affirm an
inclusive pluralism.9 Wedded to pluralism, we took on a dowery of unresolved
questions over the application of the religion clauses.
A commitment to inclusive pluralism is the core social value of those who
would agree with Judge Adams's argument for an expansion of permissible
accommodation of religion within carefully defined limits. This inclusive
pluralism is expressed in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 10 In Yoder, members of the
old Amish order objected to high school education for their children. The
Court accommodated the Amish, reasoning that compulsory education re-
quires them to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of
7. Id. at 208-15. See also R. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICAN: PROTESTANT HOPES AND
HISTORICAL REALITIES 27-28 (1984) (acceptance of disestablishment did not alter desire of most
Americans to create Protestant Christian civilization).
8. See generally B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967)
(providing powerful illustration of this process by focusing on classic political documents of
pre-revolutionary period).
9. 1 S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 637, 686 (1972); 2 S.
AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 465-66 (1972). See R. HANDY,
supra note 7 at 159-95.
10. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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their religious beliefs and thereby threatens to undermine the Amish com-
munity.' While the decision relates to mandatory accommodation, it ex-
emplifies the Court's acknowledgement that the root metaphor for American
society is no longer the melting pot but a mosaic.
Those who would most sharply disagree with Judge Adams are likely to
espouse the core social value of individual liberty. For this group, religion
is preeminently an individual experience and only trustworthy as such. Like
Madison, they tend to view a religious community as, if not the archetype,
at least a clear example of a faction. Justice Douglas's dissent in Yoder is
the quintessential modern expression of this vision. He argues that it is not
the parents' religious views which must be analyzed. Rather, the analysis
should be geared toward their children, because they are individual members
of this society.' 2 The irony of this position is that its view of an omnicom-
petent state as the righteous defender of the individual against a host of
subsidiary communities is precisely what Alexis de Tocqueville, almost one
hundred and fifty years ago, diagnosed as the blueprint for democratic
depotism. 3 Apart from the vigorous interaction and countervailing force of
a host of voluntary associations, de TocqueVille saw little hope that the
constitutional system of checks and balances could forestall the innate ten-
dency of democracies to centralize power.' 4
If we could draw the lines of debate over permissible accommodation this
sharply, a resolution to the conflict might be much easier. My sense, however,
is that many of those who support broad and more sweeping accommodations
than Judge Adams is willing to sanction are committed to a third core social
value-social order. This group flaunts Justice Douglas's proclamation in
Zorach v. Clauson,5 stating "[wie are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being.' ' 6 They can appeal to no less of an authority
than George Washington for their espousal of religion as a social glue.'
7
Contemporary spokespersons for this vision invariably subsume our separate
but interrelated religious traditions within a national holding company la-
belled "Judeo-Christian civilization."'"
In the opinions of the Court, permissible accommodation motivated by
the core value of a harmonious social order appears most strikingly in tax
exemption cases.' 9 Religious groups are seen as "beneficial and stabilizing
11. Id. at 236.
12. Id. at 243 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
13. A. DE TOCQ1JEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 690-97 (1969).
14. Id. at 506-17.
15. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
16. Id. at 313.
17. See A. REICHIEY, supra note 5, at 103.
18. See R. HANDY, supra note 7, at 204-10 (discussing enlargement in 1970's by conservative
Protestants of earlier vision of Protestant Christian American to one which includes Catholics,
Jews and Mormons).
19. The Supreme Court's treatment of the "unbroken practice" of opening legislative sessions
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influences," existing in a "harmonious relationship to the community at
large," fostering "moral or mental improvement" and should not be inhib-
ited in their activities by property taxation.20 Significantly, the Supreme
Court has made it clear in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,2' that it will
disallow tax-exempt status to institutions which engage in racially discrimi-
natory practices because "tax exemption depends on meeting certain com-
mon-law standards 6f charity-namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt
status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public
policy.'"22
III. INCLUSIVE PLURALISM VS. HARMONIOUS SOCIAL ORDER
I would argue that the principle of permissible accommodation is much
better served if it is grounded in the core value of inclusive pluralism. From
this standpoint, two objections can be raised to accommodation which is
done in the service of harmonious social order. The first is a religious
objection. The accommodation of religion primarily as a social glue debases
authentically transformative religious practice. In Lynch v. Donnelly,23 the
Pawtucket creche case, the language of accommodation is used to affirm
religious symbols and acts which are part of a national "heritage" and
whicP bolster a community spirit of goodwill by celebrating and depicting
the origins of a national holiday. 24 This position ineluctably favors what I
can only call a cultural captivity of religious symbols and acts.
Although Lynch holds that the religious intent of the creche is not wholly
neutralized by its Pawtucket setting, Justice O'Connor argues in a concurring
opinion that government sponsored celebrations of holidays with strong
secular components, like the legislative prayer sanctioned by Marsh v. Cham-
bers,25 serve "the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions,
expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what
is worthy of appreciation in society. ' 26
These are, indeed, legitimate secular purposes but the net result is more
than the neutralization of a religious symbol. As an authentically and
specifically Christian symbol, the creche proclaims that "confidence in the
future" is grounded in a radical faith in a God who chooses to be revealed
in the mystery of human birth. Sandwiched between a reindeer, clown, teddy
bear, and an elephant, the creche is effectively destroyed as a religious
with prayer as "a part of the fabric of our society" reveals a similar reverence for this core
value. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (practice of opening legislative sessions
with prayer has continued for 200 years and has become part of the fabric of our society).
20. See Waltz v. Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
21. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
22. Id. at 586.
23. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
24. Id. at 681.
25. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
26. 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19881
DEPA UL LA W RE VIEW
symbol. To state the matter bluntly, there may be many activities safeguarded
by the principle of permissible accommodation that religious communities
should repudiate in order to preserve the integrity of their symbols and
practices.
My second objection to permissible accommodation based on the core
value of harmonious social order flows from the vision of the good society
implicit in the core value of inclusive pluralism. That vision sees democracy
sustained more by an ongoing debate than by any consensus about the
common good. True to de Tocqueville, it believes that a plurality of social
organizations rather than governmental institutions should form the matrix
of democratic values. In the terminology of recent Catholic social teaching,
the principle of subsidiarity-which holds that it is "an injustice and ...
[a] disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association
what lesser and subordinate organizations can do"-should guide the process
of democratic decision making." Justice Powell, concurring with the Court's
judgment in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States28 but taking sharp issue with
its rationale, eloquently expresses this perspective's criticism of those who
value religion primarily as social glue.
In my opinion [the Court's argument] ignores the important role played
by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting,
activities and viewpoints. As Justice Brennan has observed, private, non-
profit groups receive tax exemptions because "each group contributes to
the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vig-
orous, pluralistic society." Far from representing an effort to reinforce
any perceived "common community conscience", the provision of tax
exemptions to non-profit groups is one indispensable means of limiting
the influence of governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community
life.2 9
IV. CONCLUSION: A THEOLOGICAL RESPONSE
As a scholar of religion, I seek the ultimate grounding for my case on
behalf of inclusive pluralism in a theological interpretation of the political
order. In conclusion, I simply state it: Human institutions are not divine
constructions. Human beings, however, repeatedly overestimate the value
and worth of even their best creations. Justice in a society, then, depends
upon the ability to relativize and to transform the institutional order. Relig-
ious communities which historically have demonstrated a capacity to criticize
other institutions and themselves in light of some transcendent norm or
27. U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Economic Justice for All: Catholic Social Teaching
and the U.S. Economy, in 16 ORIGINS 422-23 (1986). For an analysis of public debate versus
ideological consensus as the source of social "order", see C. LASCH, The Communitarian
Critique of Liberalism, SOUNDINGS 69 (1986).
28. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
29. Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Waltz v. Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
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reality are, therefore, especially vital to the health of society.30 In this
theological and political framework, permissible accommodations undertaken
to enhance the diversity of associations rather than to canonize the presum-
ably religious character of the majority are truly warranted.
30. See 1 R. NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, 178-207 (1941) and 2 R.
NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, 244-86 (1941) (representing classic theological
expression of this position).
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